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1Overview
In recent years, Texas’ Economic Stabilization Fund has been at the center of a heated debate. As of early 2015, 
the account balance stood at $7.5 billion, or 15 percent of the state’s General Fund expenditures, making Texas’ 
rainy day fund the nation’s second-largest in dollar terms.1 Given the state’s other pressing budgetary priorities—
particularly the need for improved water and transportation infrastructure and a desire to reduce the state’s total 
amount of outstanding debt—Texas lawmakers have been divided over whether the current level of reserves is 
sufficient or excessive. 
At the heart of this debate lies a basic disagreement over the intended purpose of the Economic Stabilization 
Fund. “It’s become a surprisingly emotional issue in the political debate,” said Dale Craymer, president of the 
nonprofit Texas Taxpayers and Research Association and a former legislative aide who helped House leaders 
draft the 1987 constitutional amendment that created the fund. “The last two sessions, the rainy day fund has 
taken on this sacred nature that was never really intended. It was intended as a management tool.”2 
As revenue and spending pressures shift along with the booms and busts of the economy, states stand to benefit 
from the additional flexibility provided by robust rainy day funds to smooth over unexpected bumps in the road.  
Despite having billions of dollars in its rainy day fund, Texas struggles to answer the question of how much is 
enough because the state lacks a clear consensus on why the fund exists in the first place. Absent a clear purpose 
for saving, other states also find it extremely difficult to set a meaningful savings target, which can confound their 
efforts to manage the budgetary ups and downs of economic activity. 
To help leaders craft effective policies for their states’ rainy day funds, The Pew Charitable Trusts examined the 
statutory or constitutional language governing these funds and the trends in their balances. The research found that:
 • Out of the 46 states with rainy day funds, more than half—27—do not clearly express in state law what they  
are seeking to achieve with them. Only one state—Minnesota—sets the level of budgetary risk it wishes to 
offset by having a fund. 
 • During the growth years of the mid-2000s, rainy day funds in 21 states were prevented from growing larger 
because balances quickly swelled to their maximum levels, which resulted in most of those states relying more 
heavily on spending cuts and tax increases to balance their budgets during and after the Great Recession. 
 • Only five states—Connecticut, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Utah—currently require by law regular, 
periodic evaluations of revenue volatility patterns in order to determine a sufficient maximum or targeted 
balance for their funds.  The remaining 41 states with rainy day funds do not have a process for re-examining 
the size of their funds in response to changing fiscal and economic conditions.
In order to arrive at an optimal savings target, Pew recommends that state policymakers consider three factors: 
1. The fund’s purpose. In order to make evidence-based determinations about how much to save, policymakers 
must first decide what they want to accomplish with the fund and how and when its balances should be 
drawn upon. To that end, the fund should have an explicit purpose that should be narrowly defined in law.
2. The volatility of the state’s revenue. States should study how their revenue systems react to the ups and 
downs of the business cycle so they can align their savings target with the state’s historical experience with 
volatility. If the purpose of the fund encompasses spending considerations such as maintaining program 
funding commitments or overall state spending at a certain level, the analysis should incorporate those 
factors as well. Rigorous examination of historical data on revenue volatility is essential to developing an 
evidence-based savings target.
23. The degree of risk the state wishes to offset. Some states use their savings to cushion the impact of budget 
cuts in response to a recession, while others strive to put away enough to avoid cuts altogether. Still others 
may want to save more to offset large, mandatory spending commitments on entitlements or other spending 
pressures that may arise. Clear parameters can provide guidance to policymakers as they determine how 
much a state needs to save in order to achieve its goals.
This report highlights the challenges states face in determining how much to save in their rainy day funds, 
gives examples of states with strong policies and processes for setting their savings targets, and offers 
recommendations for how policymakers can strengthen their funds in order to better manage volatility and plan 
for the future.
Most states lack a clear rationale for saving
In many states, reserves have proved inadequate during recessions, in part because no clear purpose guides rainy 
day fund policies. When a state’s reasons for saving are either unstated or poorly defined, policymakers lack the 
information necessary to match savings goals to needs, making it difficult to determine how much their state 
should save. For example, a state that only intends to use reserves to fill midyear shortfalls in an already approved 
budget may need to save less than a state that wants to use reserves prospectively to smooth spending across 
multiple budget cycles.3 
In Wyoming, where lawmakers are debating the ideal savings target for the state’s Legislative Stabilization 
Reserve Account, the statute that created the fund provides no guidance on its intended use. As a result, 
Governor Matt Mead has said the debate has raised basic questions: “What’s the rainy day fund for? How much 
should we have in savings?”4 Some Wyoming lawmakers would like the fund restricted to significant crises, 
such as a national recession. Others would like to see the account grow to a balance equivalent to a two-year 
budget for the state, providing a substantial insurance policy against scenarios such as a sustained fall in energy 
prices—a major risk given Wyoming’s reliance on severance tax revenue that is generated by natural resource 
extraction and energy production activities. The impact of the state’s reliance on severance revenue is illustrated 
by its 17-year revenue drought during the last sustained downturn in energy prices, when tax receipts did not 
return to their inflation-adjusted 1983 levels until 2000.5 Still others argue that the fund, at $1.8 billion at the start 
of fiscal year 2016, has grown large enough to hedge against the state’s level of budgetary uncertainty and that 
spending priorities such as infrastructure should take priority over further savings.6
How states define purposes of rainy day funds
States do not share a common purpose for saving, nor do they define their rainy day funds in the same way. For 
this study, Pew divided state statutes defining the purpose of rainy day funds into two sets of categories: explicit 
or implied purposes, and narrow or broad definitions. These categories describe the circumstances the fund is 
intended to address (purpose) and the circumstances under which the fund can be used (definition). 
Pew classified states with distinct statutory or constitutional language describing the intended purpose for their 
rainy day fund—which is separate from language governing fund withdrawals—as having an explicit purpose. Of 
the 46 states with rainy day funds, 22 define an explicit purpose in statute for at least one of their rainy day funds.
Explicit fund purpose: Indiana 
“A counter-cyclical revenue and economic stabilization fund is established to assist in stabilizing revenue 
during periods of economic recession.”7  
3In contrast, most states do not separately state in law a purpose for their fund. Instead, these states only 
provide statutory or constitutional language governing conditions under which withdrawals can be made. These 
conditions are identified as providing an implied purpose. Twenty-two states are categorized as having a rainy 
day fund purpose that is implied.8 
Implied fund purpose: New Jersey
“Balances in the ’Surplus Revenue Fund’ may be appropriated by the Legislature only: a. upon separate 
certification by the Governor that anticipated revenues in the General Fund are estimated to be less than 
those certified by him upon approval of the annual appropriation act; or b. upon a finding by the Legislature, 
based on its research, that to offset revenue declines anticipated in the General Fund an appropriation from 
the ’Surplus Revenue Fund’ is a more prudent fiscal policy than imposing new taxes or increasing any rate of 
tax or otherwise modifying the tax structure, including elimination or modification of deductions, exclusions 
or exemptions.”9
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Figure 1
The Purpose of Most State Rainy Day Funds Is Implied, Not Explicit
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4Pew also considered whether a fund’s rationale is narrowly or broadly defined. A state that sets forth a clear or 
measurable objective that leaves little doubt as to the circumstances under which the fund balance can be used is 
identified as having a narrow definition. Thirty-four states provide a narrow definition for at least one rainy day fund.
Narrow definition: Michigan
“A countercyclical budget and economic stabilization fund is created to assist in stabilizing revenue and 
employment during periods of economic recession and high unemployment.”10 
States that set forth expansive and nonspecific reasons for their rainy day funds are identified as having a broad 
definition. Ten states have broad definitions for at least one rainy day fund.11 
Broad definition: New Mexico
Withdrawals can be made from the Tax Stabilization Reserve “if the governor declares that the expenditure is 
necessary for the public peace, health and safety.”12
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Figure 2
Narrowly Defined State Rainy Day Funds Help in Setting the Right 
Savings Target
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5Although there are advantages and disadvantages with each approach to purpose and definition, states benefit 
from funds that are categorized as both explicit and narrow. For example, Maryland statute describes discrete 
objectives for the state’s rainy day fund, stipulating that it “is established to retain State revenues for future needs 
and reduce the need for future tax increases by moderating revenue growth.”13 All in all, 19 states describe their 
funds in terms that are explicit and narrow, providing the clearest guidance to policymakers for determining an 
evidence-based savings target. 
Virginia and Minnesota offer two examples of states with strong savings determinations that draw on explicit 
and narrowly defined objectives for their rainy day funds. In Virginia, “the only use for the revenue stabilization 
fund in the constitution is [to fill] a shortfall in an enacted budget,” said Virginia Secretary of Finance Ric Brown, 
emphasizing that legislators cannot use money from the reserve fund prospectively (i.e., when building a budget 
for the coming fiscal year).14 In contrast, Minnesota’s rainy day fund is intended to maintain a historically 
sustainable trend in state expenditures. By law, the state’s budget reserve “may be used when a negative 
budgetary balance is projected and when objective measures, such as reduced growth in total wages, retail sales, 
or employment, reflect downturns in the state’s economy.”15 Although they differ in how they use their funds, 
both states find that decisions about how much to save have been relatively more straightforward compared with 
states that have less clearly defined objectives.
Lance King/Getty Images
Minnesota’s evidence-based savings target draws on the explicit and narrowly defined objectives for the state’s rainy day fund.
6Definition Purpose
Explicit Implied
Narrow definition
Connecticut Arizona
Hawaii Arkansas
Idaho California
Indiana Delaware
Maine Florida
Maryland Georgia
Massachusetts Iowa
Michigan Louisiana
Minnesota Mississippi
New Mexico* Nebraska
New York Nevada
Pennsylvania New Hampshire
Rhode Island North Dakota
South Carolina* Oregon
Tennessee South Dakota
Utah
Vermont*
Virginia
Wisconsin
Broad definition
North Carolina Alabama
Ohio Alaska
West Virginia Missouri
New Jersey
Oklahoma
Texas
Washington
No purpose or definition Kentucky, Wyoming
No fund Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Montana
Table 1
Clarity of Rainy Day Fund Objectives Ranges Widely
*New Mexico, South Carolina, and Vermont each have additional rainy day funds that would fall into different categories.
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7In states where funds are not both explicitly and narrowly defined, identifying parameters for a savings target can 
be less clear-cut. Delaware, for example, is classified as having an implied purpose, drawn from its withdrawal 
rule, rather than an explicit one. Yet the state is also classified as having a narrow definition, as the withdrawal 
statute makes apparent that Delaware’s rainy day fund should be used to fill a revenue shortfall:
“The General Assembly by a three-fifths vote of the members elected to each House, may appropriate from 
the Budget Reserve Account such additional sums as may be necessary to fund any unanticipated deficit in 
any given fiscal year or to provide funds required as a result of any revenue reduction enacted by the General 
Assembly.”16  
West Virginia, however, has an explicit purpose but broad definition, allowing for withdrawals from its Revenue 
Shortfall Reserve Fund “for revenue shortfalls, for emergency revenue needs caused by acts of God or natural 
disasters or for other fiscal needs as determined solely by the Legislature.”17 This language does not provide 
clearly measurable conditions for the fund’s use, making it more difficult to determine an adequate savings target. 
Whether a fund’s purpose is explicit or implicit, states have an easier time setting the right savings target if the 
definition is drawn narrowly; funds with multiple aims or no prioritization, on the other hand, can make it difficult 
for policymakers and analysts to ascertain what level of savings is required.  
States With More Than One Reason for Saving
Twenty-five states designate multiple reasons for their funds, providing a variety of situations 
that reserves should address. Establishing more than one reason for saving can give states 
flexibility in using reserves; however, in order to best estimate an optimal savings target, states 
should strive to define these multiple reasons as narrowly as possible. Having more than 
one stated fund purpose can complicate the effort of estimating the right fund target, but it 
should be possible if those reasons for saving are narrowly defined. In Hawaii, for example, the 
Legislature may make appropriations for four reasons: 
“ (1) To maintain levels of programs determined to be essential to public health, safety, 
welfare, and education;
“(2) To provide for counter cyclical economic and employment programs in periods of 
economic downturn;
“(3) To restore facilities destroyed or damaged or services disrupted by disaster in any 
county; and
“(4) To meet other emergencies when declared by the governor or determined to be urgent 
by the legislature.”18
This provides a set of measurable, easily communicated conditions when rainy day fund 
reserves should be used. Similarly, California’s Budget Stabilization Account can be utilized 
Continued on next page
8Notably, one state that has struggled with fund clarity made significant progress this year. Connecticut 
lawmakers enacted substantial reforms to the state’s Budget Reserve Fund in the fiscal 2016-17 state budget, 
including a significant amendment to the fund’s statutory purpose. The state’s prior statutory language, which 
follows, did not explicitly define the fund’s aim or what kinds of deficit situations the fund was intended to 
address—for example, whether it could be used to address shortfalls resulting from forecasting errors, economic 
downturns, or both:
“When in any fiscal year the Comptroller has determined the amount of a deficit applicable with respect to 
the immediately preceding fiscal year, to the extent necessary, the amount of funds credited to said Budget 
Reserve Fund shall be deemed to be appropriated for purposes of funding such deficit.”22
By contrast, the budget bill signed into law in June 2015 establishes a clear, distinct statement of purpose for the 
Budget Reserve Fund:
“Moneys in the Budget Reserve Fund shall be maintained and invested for the purpose of reducing revenue 
volatility in the General Fund and reducing the need for increases in tax revenue and reductions in state aid 
due to economic changes.”23
Unlike the previous language, the new text explicitly tasks the Budget Reserve Fund with addressing fiscal 
imbalances caused by economic conditions. This change provides clearer guidelines to lawmakers about when 
they should withdraw reserves and just how large the fund should be.  
under two so-called “budget emergency”19 scenarios. One definition refers to man-made or 
natural disasters: 
“The existence, as declared by the Governor, of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril 
to the safety of persons and property within the State, or parts thereof, caused by such 
conditions as attack or probable or imminent attack by an enemy of the United States, fire, 
flood, drought, storm, civil disorder, earthquake, or volcanic eruption.”20 
The state also allows for a fiscal crisis to constitute a budget emergency: 
“A determination by the Governor that estimated resources are inadequate to fund General 
Fund expenditures for the current or ensuing fiscal year … at a level equal to the highest 
amount of total General Fund expenditures estimated at the time of enactment of any of 
the three most recent Budget Acts.”21
Despite the difference in these two purposes, each provides clear guidance regarding the 
conditions under which reserves can be spent. This allows the state to use a single fund to 
protect against genuine disasters and prospective budgetary shortfalls. 
9States struggle to determine how much to save
All state tax revenue has some degree of sensitivity to the business cycle. As Pew has documented in “Managing 
Uncertainty” (2014) and in two joint reports with the Rockefeller Institute of Government, Cracks in the Crystal 
Ball (2011) and “Managing Volatile Tax Collections in State Revenue Forecasts” (2014), recent evidence suggests 
that state tax collections have grown more volatile over the past decade. Shifts in personal income toward capital 
gains, greater reliance on revenue from extractive industries, and a narrowing of the sales tax base due to online 
sales and untaxed services all contribute to this increasing volatility.29 
This uncertainty makes it a challenge for policymakers to determine what level of savings is necessary to 
effectively manage the ups and downs of the business cycle. For example, during the growth years of the mid-
2000s, the rainy day funds in 21 states hit their savings targets or caps—statutory or constitutional maximums 
for the funds, often calculated as a percentage of revenue or appropriations.30 Pew’s examination of states’ 
revenue shows that many states could have saved more during this period and that these additional savings 
would have aided them when the Great Recession hit.31 In the aftermath of the recession, 16 states, including 11 
that hit their rainy day fund limits during the mid-2000s, increased their caps or savings targets in recognition of 
the fact that their reserves were inadequate for a significant economic downturn. 
For Rainy Day Funds, Consider Both Policy and Practice
The purpose of a fund as defined in statute may not reflect how the fund is actually used. New 
York’s law says the state’s two funds—the Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund and the Rainy Day 
Reserve Fund—should be used primarily for the stabilization of tax revenue,24 in the case of the 
first fund, and during economic downturns or catastrophic events, in the case of the second.25 
However, as highlighted by the Citizen’s Budget Commission of New York, an independent 
policy research and monitoring organization, the state can borrow money from either fund as 
long as the loan is repaid within the current fiscal year. In recent times, the state has therefore 
used both rainy day funds primarily for short-term cash flow needs, drawing down the entirety 
of the balances at the beginning of each fiscal year.26 As a result, New York’s reserves have not 
been used to stabilize revenue during downturns in over two decades because when the state 
has needed to access the reserves during a downturn, no funds have been available.  
Arizona’s statute outlines a process for comparing current revenue to that of the previous 
seven years to determine when the state should deposit or withdraw funds from its Budget 
Stabilization Fund. However, that calculation is only a recommendation; the decision of whether 
and how much to deposit or withdraw is in the hands of the Legislature and the governor. “I 
think over the life of the program, only a few times have we ever followed the formula—I don’t 
know how many, maybe two, three times since 1992,” said Hans Olofsson, the chief economist 
with the state’s Joint Legislative Budget Committee.27
With rainy day funds, both policy and practice matter. Multiple credit rating agencies have 
indicated to Pew that they consider both the legal guidance surrounding these funds as well as a 
state’s individual histories of deposits and withdrawals when assigning debt ratings to a state.28
10
State Hit maximum balance in mid-200s Previous maximum balance
New maximum or 
target balance
California* No 5% of current fiscal year’s  General Fund revenue
10% of current fiscal year’s  
General Fund revenue
Connecticut No 10% of current fiscal year’s  General Fund appropriations
15% of current fiscal year’s  
General Fund appropriations†
Georgia Yes 10% of previous fiscal year’s revenue 15% of previous fiscal year’s revenue
Idaho Yes 5% of General Fund revenue 10% of General Fund revenue
Maine No 12% of General Fund revenue 18% of General Fund revenue
Minnesota Yes $653 million $811 million‡
Nevada No 15% of General Fund appropriations 20% of General Fund appropriations
New York* Yes 3% of projected General Fund appropriations in next fiscal year
5% of projected General Fund 
appropriations in next fiscal year
North Dakota Yes 5% of current General Fund appropriations
9.5% of current General Fund 
appropriations
Ohio No 5% of previous fiscal year’s  General Fund revenue
8.5% of previous fiscal year’s  
General Fund revenue
Oklahoma Yes 10% of General Fund revenue 15% of General Fund revenue
South Carolina* Yes 3% of General Fund revenue 5% of General Fund revenue
Tennessee Yes 5% of estimated tax revenue allocated to General Fund and Education Trust Fund
8% of estimated tax revenue allocated to 
General Fund and Education Trust Fund
Utah Yes 6% of General Fund appropriations 9% of General Fund appropriations
Vermont* Yes 1% of previous fiscal year’s  General Fund appropriations
5% of previous fiscal year’s  
General Fund appropriations
Virginia Yes 10% of average revenue collections for preceding three fiscal years
15% of average revenue collections for 
preceding three fiscal years
Table 2
16 States Increased Statutory Maximum or Target Balances After the 
Great Recession
* indicates states that have more than one rainy day fund. 
† Connecticut’s new maximum balance is effective in fiscal year 2020.
‡  Because Minnesota’s Budget Reserve Account was reformed in 2014, the figure cited no longer represents the maximum balance. Instead, 
$811 million represents a level up to which surplus state revenue should be automatically deposited in the Budget Reserve Account. The 
effective savings target for the account includes additional deposits and sits at a higher level determined by Minnesota Management & 
Continued on next page
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Whether a state has other reserve funds addressing specific programmatic areas also influences a rainy day 
fund balance’s ideal size. Many states, for example, have dedicated education reserve funds, and a few have 
funds directed to Medicaid spending or disaster relief. The existence of these additional funds may affect the 
overall scope of activities that a general rainy day fund is expected to address. If state leaders see their various 
reserve funds as complementary, they may prefer to consider all reserve fund balances in total when determining 
a savings target, as is done in Minnesota.33 In other states, such as Utah, policymakers’ preference may be to 
assess funds separately, given restrictions on the withdrawal and use of fund balances. 
Most states’ savings targets do not reflect revenue volatility
States often neglect to consider their level of revenue volatility when setting savings targets; Pew‘s analysis of the 
statutory or constitutional language governing  rainy day funds found that few states mandate a process requiring 
that data on revenue and economic performance be used to determine how much the state saves. Furthermore, 
Pew researched whether states with higher levels of revenue volatility have larger savings targets or maximum 
balances and found no meaningful connection.34 
These pieces of evidence, along with conversations with state policymakers, indicate that most states base their 
caps on arbitrary benchmarks or what is politically palatable in lieu of empirical observations about their level of 
revenue volatility and budgetary risk. In Idaho, for example, lawmakers in 2014 increased the cap for the state’s 
rainy day fund from 5 percent to 10 percent. This new cap, however, was not the result of an evidence-based 
assessment of the state’s reserve needs but was instead a figure acceptable to policymakers across the political 
spectrum. “We knew that 5 [percent] wasn’t enough,” said Idaho Budget Director Jani Revier, “but 10 percent 
does not reflect any best management practice on the appropriate amount of money set aside. Rather, it is more 
a number that there was consensus behind and we were comfortable with.”35
Budget (MMB) and is updated periodically throughout the fiscal year. As of October 2015, the funded level for the account is $994 million. 
Further, in its September 2015 “Budget Reserve Report,” MMB recommends a combined $2.03 billion savings target for the Budget Reserve 
Account and the separate Cash Flow Account in the fiscal 2016-17 biennium. 32
Note: California increased the target for its Budget Stabilization Account but did not modify its Special Fund for Economic Uncertainties. 
New York raised the target for its Rainy Day Reserve Fund but did not modify the target for its Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund. South Carolina 
increased the target for its Capital Reserve Fund but did not change the target for the General Reserve Fund. Vermont raised the target for its 
General Fund Budget Stabilization Reserve but did not alter its Rainy Day Reserve’s target.
Sources: California Const. Art. XVI, § 20(e) (2015), as amended by Proposition 2 (Legislative Constitutional Amendment), approved Nov. 4, 
2014; Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 4-30a (2015), as amended by Connecticut Pub. L. No. 15-244 (2015); Georgia Code Ann. § 45-12-93 (2015) as 
amended by Senate Bill 421 (2010); Idaho Code § 57-814 (2015), as amended by Senate Bill 1408 (2014); 5 Maine Rev. Stat. § 1532(1) (2015), 
as amended by Maine Pub. L. 2015, Ch. 267; Minnesota Stat. § 16A.152 (2015), as amended by H.F. 1777 (2014); Nevada Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
353.288 (2014), as amended by Assembly Bill No. 165 (2009); New York State Fin. Law § 92-cc (2015), as amended by Senate Bill 4610-A 
(2015); North Dakota Cent. Code, § 54-27.2-01 (2015), as amended by North Dakota Session Law 2007, ch. 26 and North Dakota Session 
Law 2011, ch. 483; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 131.44 (2015), as amended by House Bill 64, Main Operation Budget FY2016-FY2017 (2015); 
Oklahoma Const. Art. X, § 23 (2015), as amended by Enrolled Senate Joint Resolution No. 51 (2010); South Carolina Const. Ann. Art. III, § 
36(A) (2015), as amended by S.0006 (Ratification No. 172, Act 152) (2012); Tennessee Code Ann. § 9-4-211 (a) (2) (2015), as amended by 
2013 Tennessee Public Acts, ch. 175; Utah Code Ann. § 63J-1-312 (3) (a) (ii), as amended by H.B. 333 Budget Reserve Account Amendments 
(2015); Vermont Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 308(b) (2015), as amended by Vermont H.781 (2012); and Virginia Const. Art. X, § 8 (2015), amended 
by Virginia Session Law 2010, ch. 606.
© 2015 The Pew Charitable Trusts
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Budgetary risk should inform policy
Understanding a state’s experience with revenue volatility is an important step in determining the right savings 
target. However, this determination should also consider what level of budgetary risk policymakers wish to 
offset—or how much of a hypothetical shortfall they intend to fill. In doing so, states should consider both their 
revenue volatility and their spending commitments, including mandatory spending on major programmatic areas 
such as Medicaid as well as discretionary spending on core functions such as education and public safety.  States 
facing fast-growing mandatory commitments or unique fiscal pressures, such as rapid population growth, may 
want to set higher savings targets. 
Virginia and Minnesota offer two examples of states with robust reserve policies that exhibit very different 
levels of risk tolerance. Virginia’s constitution allows state leaders to use the state’s fund to cover no more 
than 50 percent of a shortfall in a fiscal year; as a result, the state must find programmatic cuts or tax changes 
to balance its budget during periods of revenue decline. The fund “provided time for the General Assembly to 
make meaningful adjustments, to structurally put the budget back into balance,” said Ric Brown, the finance 
secretary. “It does provide a transition period where you don’t quite have to cut as fast in attempting to make 
those changes, and that, from a practical standpoint and a political standpoint, is very advantageous.”37 However, 
Virginia has no evidence-driven process for determining how much to save.38 
Minnesota, by contrast, has a rigorous two-part process, developed collaboratively by executive and legislative 
staffs, for setting its savings target. State economists perform an annual analysis of historic volatility in the 
parts of the state’s economy that are subject to taxation, and then update their savings target to provide full 
coverage—a much higher level than in Virginia—for an array of possible revenue downturns.  
The Minnesota methodology first uses statistical models to quantify the volatility of each of the state’s revenue 
streams. The resulting estimates are combined to form a model of overall volatility across all state revenue. Most 
importantly, this volatility is examined over time, meaning that the current estimate is informed by both previous 
volatility and recent conditions. 
Setting a Floor—but No Ceiling—for Texas’ Economic Stabilization Fund
In November 2014, Texas voters approved a ballot proposition diverting a significant share of 
severance tax revenue in excess of historic collections that previously went to the Economic 
Stabilization Fund to highway spending. Legislation was then passed that requires a committee 
of 10 state legislators to determine the minimum balance of the stabilization fund, considering 
historic fund usage, highway budget pressures, and the state’s financial condition. The 
committee met for the first time in December 2014 and set a minimum balance of $7 billion 
for fiscal 2015, 2016, and 2017.36 However, the maximum balance for the fund is not revisited 
periodically in a similar fashion. Since debate over how best to use Texas’ massive fund balance 
continues, the state stands to benefit from greater clarity about why it saves so successfully as 
well as how much budgetary risk it wishes to guard against.
13
Next the state specifies the level of coverage it desires to provide with its reserves in the event of a revenue 
downturn. Similar to an insurance policy, where the price reflects statistical assumptions about the likelihood 
of an unwanted event, this approach allows policymakers to determine their desired failure rate—namely, the 
tolerance policymakers have for not fully covering a potential shortfall—which affects how much the state should 
save.39 Currently, lawmakers have opted to save enough money to entirely cover the estimated revenue shortfalls 
that would result in 9 out of 10 possible downturn scenarios.40
Since this policy was enacted in 2014, Minnesota Management & Budget has raised its recommended combined 
savings target for the state’s Budget Reserve and Cash Flow accounts to $2.03 billion,41 doubling the $1 billion 
the state was required to hold in the accounts prior to the reform.42 Other states can learn from these methods. 
Lawmakers in Wyoming, for example, are currently adapting Minnesota’s approach in order to insulate against 
their state’s exceptionally volatile revenue. 
Ultimately, there is no right or wrong level for what a state’s budgetary risk tolerance should be. States may opt 
to guard against more or less risk depending on their own spending priorities, obligations, and political cultures. 
What is most important for setting an appropriate optimal size is ensuring that a reserve fund provides a state’s 
government with its desired level of insurance against recession-driven budgetary risk. 
Recommendations
For states seeking to improve their savings targets for rainy day funds, Pew recommends three best practices to 
better align targets with goals.
Explicitly define, in law, the purpose of a rainy day fund 
Doing so allows policymakers to identify under what conditions a fund will be used and facilitates accurate 
estimates for the magnitude of the shortfalls the fund is expected to offset. This is easiest when fund purposes 
are both clearly defined and narrowly drawn. Limiting the purpose to a few key objectives, having a single 
purpose, or clearly communicating a primary purpose allows states to more closely align savings targets with 
measurable shortfall scenarios.   
Utah, for example, explicitly lists four conditions that the state’s Budget Reserve Account is intended to address. 
State statute provides for withdrawals in order to “(a) resolve a General Fund budget deficit, for the fiscal year in 
which the General Fund budget deficit occurs, (b) pay certain state settlements, (c) pay retroactive tax refunds, 
or (d) resolve an Education Fund budget deficit.”43 
Align savings targets with the fund’s purpose as well as with the state’s tax volatility
Once questions about both the purpose of the fund and the volatility of state revenue are addressed, states can 
use the evidence to conclude how much, ideally, they should be saving.
Minnesota follows the most rigorous process Pew found for determining the ideal level of rainy day fund savings. 
State policymakers analyze patterns in the state’s revenue volatility and use the fund’s statutory purpose as 
evidence to annually revise the size of the state’s savings target in an ever-changing economic and fiscal landscape. 
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Determine and clearly express the level of budgetary risk the state seeks to offset
A maximum savings target or cap should be based on the level of budgetary risk a state intends to offset, which 
can be adjusted to reconcile policymakers’ preferences with other budget priorities and political sensitivities. 
States that struggle to decide how much to save should consider the promising practices of Virginia (which aims 
to offset just half of an unexpected current-year shortfall) and Minnesota (which aims for total coverage of 90 
percent of expected shortfalls over a biennium), even if their budgetary circumstances are significantly different. 
Conclusion
In recent years, many states have moved toward evidence-based processes for determining their rainy day 
funds’ optimal sizes. Several states, such as Illinois, Montana, and Wyoming, have conducted one-time volatility 
studies in order to better understand their economic and revenue fluctuations. When done on a recurring basis, 
as recommended by The Pew Charitable Trusts in a 2014 report Building State Rainy Day Funds, these studies can 
help inform savings policy. Connecticut’s reforms and Nebraska’s new requirement to conduct periodic volatility 
studies will put these states in a leading position on rainy day fund policy, alongside Minnesota and Utah.
Without a stated reason for saving, states frequently struggle to determine how much they should save in their 
rainy day funds. Many states have historically saved too little, leaving them exposed to avoidable cuts and tax 
increases during downturns, while  others have saved more than they actually need, forgoing other budgetary 
options. When setting rainy day fund policies, states should explicitly define the purpose of their fund in statute, 
study their tax volatility, and identify what level of budgetary risk they intend to offset. The result of these policy 
actions will be a fund that is the correct size to guard against the unexpected while enhancing states’ fiscal health 
over the long term.
LanceKing/Getty Images
Since the Great Recession, New York—like 15 other states—has increased the savings target for its rainy day fund.
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Appendix A: Methodology
For this report, Pew conducted two rounds of classification related to the scope of each fund’s purpose. This 
effort identified whether states’ funds had clearly and narrowly defined objectives that could provide guidance for 
how empirical evidence might be employed to inform a savings target. 
Rainy day fund identification
In an earlier report, Building State Rainy Day Funds, Pew researchers identified and examined the statutory 
and constitutional guidelines in all 50 states pertaining to the mechanisms for depositing money into budget 
stabilization funds. States use a number of funds to set aside money for various purposes. To focus on the 
challenge of managing volatility, Pew narrowed the scope of this report to include only budget stabilization 
funds, using the definition set forth by Yilin Hou in State Budget Stabilization.44 Hou’s definition identifies three 
key characteristics of these funds. First, there must be enabling legislation that establishes them. Second, they 
operate across fiscal years and over the whole economic cycle (i.e., rather than cash flow funds for use during the 
fiscal year or legacy funds like North Dakota’s). Third, they must serve as government-wide reserves for general 
purposes (i.e., not for Medicaid or education specifically). 
To assemble the list of qualifying funds, Pew built upon previous research examining these types of reserves, 
collecting data from three peer-reviewed academic sources as well as the National Conference of State Legislatures 
and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.45 The researchers cross-referenced these five sources to develop a list 
of 52 budget stabilization funds across 46 states, then further verified them by identifying their enabling legislation. 
For each valid fund, Pew examined the enabling statute to detail the designated purpose and scope of the fund.
Purpose and definition classification
The first iteration of coding focused on whether the enabling text provided a distinct statement of purpose for the 
rainy day fund in state law. If a state provided statutory or constitutional language specifically designating the goal(s) 
for the fund, Pew categorized the fund as having an “explicit” purpose. Conversely, a fund was classified as having 
an “implied” purpose if the state constitution or statute did not provide any statement regarding the fund’s goals, 
leaving the purpose to be determined by the conditions for withdrawal. Two researchers separately examined and 
classified each fund to ensure accuracy. In the event that the coding was in disagreement, a team of four researchers 
discussed the statutory/constitutional language until it reached an agreement on the appropriate category. 
The second classification examined each fund’s purpose statement from the perspective of a state fiscal analyst 
charged with identifying an evidence-based savings target. This step was intended to determine which funds were 
adequately defined to assist in the state’s efforts to gauge how much to save. Researchers were asked to discern 
whether the stated objectives of the fund were clear and measurable so that they could be used to estimate 
a savings target. In the event that the fund’s objectives were drawn precisely enough to provide a potential 
reference point for a savings target, Pew classified the fund as having a “narrow” definition. However, if the 
objectives defined were vague, nonspecific, or too expansive to inform a savings target, Pew classified the fund as 
having a “broad” definition. Similar to the explicit/implied classification, each fund was examined and classified 
separately by two researchers to improve accuracy. If the coding was in disagreement, a team of four researchers 
discussed the statutory/constitutional language until it reached an agreement on the appropriate category. 
The following table provides a statutory citation for each rainy day fund, along with Pew’s classifications 
regarding whether the fund’s purpose is explicitly stated or implied, and whether the purpose is defined narrowly 
enough for an evidence-based savings target determination or too broadly to be informed by empirical evidence.
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State Fund Statute Purpose Definition
Alabama General Fund Rainy Day Account
Ala. Const. Art. XIV, § 260.02 
(2015) Implied Broad
Alaska Constitutional Budget Reserve Fund
Alaska Const. Art. IX, § 17(c) 
(2015) Implied Broad
Alaska Statutory Budget Reserve Fund
Alaska Stat. § 37.05.540(c) 
(2015) Implied Broad
Arizona Budget Stabilization Fund Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 35-144(C) (2015) Implied Narrow
Arkansas Rainy Day Fund Ark. Code Ann. § 19-6-486(d) (2015) Implied Narrow
California Budget Stabilization Account Calif. Const. Art. XVI § 22 (2015) Implied Narrow
California Special Fund for Economic Uncertainties
Calif. Gov. Code § 16418(b) 
(2015) Implied Narrow
Colorado No fund No fund N/A N/A 
Connecticut Budget Reserve Fund
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-30a(b) 
(2015), as amended by Conn. 
Pub. L. No. 15-244 (2015)*
Explicit Narrow
Delaware Budget Reserve Account Del. Const. Art. VIII, § 6(d) (2015) Implied Narrow
Florida Budget Stabilization Fund Fla. Stat. § 216.222 (2015) Implied Narrow
Georgia Revenue Shortfall Reserve Ga. Code Ann. § 45-12-93 (2015) Implied Narrow
Hawaii Emergency and Budget Reserve Fund
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 328L-3(d) 
(2015) Explicit Narrow
Idaho Budget Stabilization Fund Idaho Code § 57-814(1) (2015) Explicit Narrow
Illinois No fund No fund N/A N/A 
Indiana
Countercyclical 
Revenue and Economic 
Stabilization Fund
Ind. Code Ann. § 4-10-18-2(a) 
(2015) Explicit Narrow
Iowa Economic Emergency Fund Iowa Code § 8.55(3) (2015) Implied Narrow
Kansas No fund No fund N/A N/A 
Continued on next page
Table A.1
Most States Do Not Explicitly and Narrowly Define a Purpose in 
State Law for Their Funds
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State Fund Statute Purpose Definition
Kentucky Budget Reserve Trust Fund Account N/A No purpose No definition
Louisiana  Budget Stabilization Fund La. R.S. 39:94(C) (2015) Implied Narrow
Maine Budget Stabilization Fund Maine Rev. Stat. § 1532 (2015) Explicit Narrow
Maryland Revenue Stabilization Account
Md. State Fin. & Procurement 
Code § 7-311(b) (2015) Explicit Narrow
Massachusetts Commonwealth Stabilization Fund
Ann. Law of Mass. Gen. Law ch. 
29, § 2H (2015) Explicit Narrow
Michigan
Countercyclical 
Budget and Economic 
Stabilization Fund
Mich. Comp. L. Stat. § 18.1351 
(2015) Explicit Narrow
Minnesota Budget Reserve Account Minn. Stat. § 16A.152, Subd. 3. (2015) Explicit Narrow
Mississippi
Working Cash-
Stabilization Reserve 
Fund
Miss. Code Ann. § 27-103-203 
(2015) Implied Narrow
Missouri Budget Reserve Fund Mo. Const. Art. IV, § 27(a) (5) (2015) Implied Broad
Montana No fund No fund N/A N/A 
Nebraska Cash Reserve Fund Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-612 (2015) Implied Narrow
Nevada
Account to Stabilize 
Operation of State 
Government
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 353.288 
(2015) Implied Narrow
New Hampshire Revenue Stabilization Reserve Account
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:13-e (III) 
(2015) Implied Narrow
New Jersey Surplus Revenue Fund N.J. Stat. § 52:9H-18 (2015) Implied Broad
New Mexico General Fund Operating Reserve
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-2.1(B) 
(2015) Explicit Narrow
New Mexico General Fund Tax Stabilization Reserve N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-2.2 (2015) Implied Broad
New York Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund N.Y. State Fin. Law § 92(1) (2015) Explicit Narrow
New York Rainy Day Reserve Fund N.Y. State Fin. Law § 92-cc(3) (2015) Explicit Narrow
North Carolina Savings Reserve Account N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143C-4-2(c) (2015) Explicit Broad
North Dakota Budget Stabilization Fund N.D. Cent. Code, § 54-27.2-03  (2015) Implied Narrow
Continued on next page
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State Fund Statute Purpose Definition
Ohio Budget Stabilization Fund Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 131.43  (2015) Explicit Broad
Oklahoma Constitutional Reserve Fund
Okla. Const. Art. X, § 23(6-8) 
(2015) Implied Broad
Oregon Rainy Day Fund Ore. Rev. Stat. § 293.144 (2015) Implied Narrow
Pennsylvania Budget Stabilization Reserve Fund
Pa. Stat. tit. 72 § 1703-A(a) 
(2015) Explicit Narrow
Rhode Island Budget Reserve and Cash Stabilization Account R.I. Gen. L. § 35-3-20(a) (2015) Explicit Narrow
South Carolina General Reserve Fund S.C. Const. Ann. Art. III, § 36(A) (2015) Explicit Narrow
South Carolina Capital Reserve Fund S.C. Code Ann. § 11-11-320(C) (2015) Implied Narrow
South Dakota Budget Reserve Fund S.D. Codified Laws § 4-7-32 (2015) Implied Narrow
Tennessee Reserve for Revenue Fluctuations
Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-4-211(a)(1) 
(2015) Explicit Narrow
Texas Economic Stabilization Fund
Texas Const. Art. III, § 49-g(j) 
(2015) Implied Broad
Utah Budget Reserve Account Utah Code Ann. § 63J-1-312(4) (2015) Explicit Narrow
Vermont General Fund Budget Stabilization Reserve
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 308(a) 
(2015) Explicit Narrow
Vermont Rainy Day Reserve  Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 308c(b) (2015) Implied Narrow
Virginia Revenue Stabilization Fund Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-1828 (2015) Explicit Narrow
Washington Budget Stabilization Account
Wash. Const. Art. VII, § 12(d) 
(2015) Implied Broad
West Virginia Revenue Shortfall Reserve Fund W.Va. Code § 11B-2-20(d) (2015) Explicit Broad
Wisconsin Budget Stabilization Fund Wis. Stat. § 25.60  (2015) Explicit Narrow
Wyoming Legislative Stabilization Reserve Account
Enrolled Act No. 90, 2005 Wyo. 
Session Laws § 301-d No purpose No definition
* Effective July 1, 2019
© 2015 The Pew Charitable Trusts
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State Fund name Cap or target Statute
Alabama General Fund Rainy Day Account
10% of previous fiscal year's General 
Fund appropriations minus prior 
years' rainy day account withdrawals 
that have not been repaid
Ala. Const. Art. XIV, § 260.02(a) 
(2015)
Alaska Constitutional Budget Reserve Fund No cap Alaska Const. Art. IX, § 17  (2015)
Alaska Statutory Budget Reserve Fund No cap Alaska Stat. § 37.05.540  (2015)
Arizona Budget Stabilization Fund 7%  of current fiscal year’s General Fund revenue Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 35-144(H) (2015)
Arkansas Rainy Day Fund $125 million Ark. Code Ann. § 19-6-486(f) (2015)
California Budget Stabilization Account 10% of current fiscal year’s estimated General Fund revenue Calif. Const., Art. XVI § 20(e) (2015)
California Special Fund for Economic Uncertainties No statutory cap or target Calif. Gov. Code § 16418 (2015) 
Colorado No fund  N/A N/A 
Connecticut Budget Reserve Fund 15% of current fiscal year’s General Fund appropriations
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-30a(a)(6) 
(2015) as amended by Conn. Pub. L. 
No. 15-244 (2015)*
Delaware Budget Reserve Account 5% of current fiscal year’s estimated General Fund revenue Del. Const. Art. VIII, § 6 (d) (2015)
Florida Budget Stabilization Fund 10% of prior fiscal year’s General Fund revenue Fla. Stat. § 215.32(2)(c)(1) (2015)
Georgia Revenue Shortfall Reserve 15% of prior fiscal year’s net revenue Ga. Code Ann. § 45-12-93(h) (2015)
Hawaii Emergency and Budget Reserve Fund 10% of prior fiscal year’s General Funds revenue
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 328L-3(a)(3) 
(2015)
Idaho Budget Stabilization Fund 10% of  prior fiscal year’s General Fund revenue Idaho Code § 57-814 (2)(b) (2015)
†
Illinois No fund  N/A N/A 
Table B.1
Statutory Caps and Targets for State Rainy Day Funds as a 
Percentage of FY 2015 General Fund Revenue 
Appendix B: State rainy day fund caps and targets
The following table displays each state’s rainy day fund target or maximum balance as defined by state law as of 
October 2015, unless otherwise noted. In cases where a fund has both a savings target and a higher maximum 
balance defined in statute, the maximum balance is listed. 
Continued on next page
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State Fund name Cap or target Statute
Indiana Countercyclical Revenue and Economic Stabilization Fund
7% of current fiscal year’s General 
Fund revenue Ind. Code Ann. § 4-10-18-8 (2015)
Iowa Economic Emergency Fund 2.5% of current fiscal year’s estimated General Fund revenue Iowa Code § 8.55(2) (2015)
Kansas No fund  N/A N/A 
Kentucky Budget Reserve Trust Fund Account 5% of current fiscal year’s General Fund revenue Ky. Rev. Stat. § 48.705(3) (2015)
Louisiana Budget Stabilization Fund 4% of prior fiscal year’s total state revenue La. Rev. Stat. 39:94(C)(4)(a) (2015)
Maine Budget Stabilization Fund 18% of prior fiscal year’s General Fund revenue
5 Maine Rev. Stat. § 1532(1) (2015) 
as amended by Maine Pub. L. (2015), 
Ch. 267‡ 
Maryland Revenue Stabilization Account 7.5% of current fiscal year’s estimated General Fund revenue
Md. State Fin. & Procurement Code § 
7-311(e)(2) (2015)
Massachusetts Commonwealth Stabilization Fund 15% of prior fiscal year’s budgeted  revenue
Ann. Law of Mass. Gen. Law ch. 29, § 
2H (2015)
Michigan Countercyclical Budget and Economic Stabilization Fund
10% of prior fiscal year’s combined 
School Aid Fund and General Fund-
General Purpose revenue
Mich. Comp. L. Stat. § 18.1356 (2015)
Minnesota Budget Reserve Account $810,992,000§ Minn. Stat. § 16A.152 Subd. 2(a)(2) (2015)
Mississippi Working Cash-Stabilization Reserve Fund
7.5% of current fiscal year’s General 
Fund appropriations
Miss. Code Ann. § 27-103-213(3)(d) 
(2015)
Missouri Budget Reserve Fund 10% of current fiscal year’s net general revenue Mo. Const. Art. IV, § 27(a)(7) (2015)
Montana No fund  N/A N/A 
Nebraska Cash Reserve Fund No statutory target or cap Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-612 (2015) 
Nevada Account to Stabilize Operation of State Government
20% of current fiscal year’s General 
Fund appropriations
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 353.288(3) 
(2015)
New Hampshire Revenue Stabilization Reserve Account
10% of prior fiscal year’s  General 
Fund revenue
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:13-e (V) 
(2015)
New Jersey Surplus Revenue Fund
5% of current fiscal year’s estimated 
General Fund and Property Tax Relief 
Fund revenue
N.J. Stat. § 52:9H-21 (2015)
New Mexico General Fund Operating Reserve
8% of prior fiscal year’s 
aggregate recurring General Fund 
appropriations
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-4 (2015)
New Mexico General Fund Tax Stabilization Reserve
6% of the prior fiscal year’s 
aggregate recurring General Fund 
appropriations
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-4 (2015)
New York Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund 2% of current fiscal year’s General Fund expenditures N.Y. State Fin. Law § 92(3) (2015)
Continued on next page
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State Fund name Cap or target Statute
New York Rainy Day Reserve Fund 5% of next fiscal year’s projected General Fund expenditures N.Y. State Fin. Law § 92-cc(1) (2015)
North Carolina Savings Reserve Account 8% of the prior fiscal year's General Fund operating budget N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143C-4-2(c) (2015)
North Dakota Budget Stabilization Fund 9.5% of current fiscal biennium’s General Fund appropriations N.D. Cent. Code, § 54-27.2-01 (2015)
Ohio Budget Stabilization Fund 8.5% of prior fiscal year’s General Fund revenue
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 131.44(B)(1)
(a) (2015)
Oklahoma Constitutional Reserve Fund 15% of prior fiscal year’s certified General Revenue Okla. Const. Art. X, § 23(5)  (2015)
Oregon Rainy Day Fund 7.5% of prior fiscal biennium's General Fund revenue Ore. Rev. Stat. § 293.148 (1) (2015)
Pennsylvania Budget Stabilization Reserve Fund 6% of current fiscal year’s General Fund revenue Pa. Stat. tit. 72 § 1702-A(b)(2) (2015)
Rhode Island Budget Reserve and Cash Stabilization Account
5% of current fiscal year’s estimated 
state general revenue R.I. Gen. Laws § 35-3-20.1(b) (2015)
South Carolina General Reserve Fund 5% of prior fiscal year’s General Fund revenue
S.C. Const. Ann. Art. III, § 36(A) 
(2015)
South Carolina Capital Reserve Fund 2% of prior fiscal year’s General Fund revenue S.C. Code Ann. § 11-11-320(A) (2014)
South Dakota Budget Reserve Fund 10% of prior fiscal year’s General Fund appropriations S.D. Codified Laws § 4-7-32 (2015)
Tennessee Reserve for Revenue Fluctuations
8% of current fiscal year's estimated 
sales tax revenue for the General 
Fund and Education Trust Fund 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-4-211(a)(2) 
(2015)
Texas Economic Stabilization Fund 10% of prior fiscal biennium’s general revenue Texas Const. Art. III, § 49-g(g) (2014)
Utah Budget Reserve Account 9% of current fiscal year’s General Fund appropriations
Utah Code Ann. § 63J-1-312 (3)(a)
(ii) (2015)
Vermont General Fund Budget Stabilization Reserve
5% of prior fiscal year’s General Fund 
appropriations Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 308(b) (2015)
Vermont Rainy Day Reserve 5% of prior fiscal year’s General Fund appropriations
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 308(c)(a) 
(2015)
Virginia Revenue Stabilization Fund
15% of prior three fiscal years’ 
average annual income and retail 
sales tax revenue
Va. Const. Art. X, § 8 (2015)
Washington Budget Stabilization Account 10% of current fiscal year’s estimated general state revenue Wash. Const. Art. VII, § 12(e) (2015)
West Virginia Revenue Shortfall Reserve Fund 13% of prior fiscal year’s State Fund-General Revenue appropriations W.Va. Code § 11B-2-20(b) (2015)
Wisconsin Budget Stabilization Fund 5% of current fiscal year’s estimated General Fund expenditures Wis. Stat. § 16.518(3)(1) (2015)
Wyoming Legislative Stabilization Reserve Account No cap
Wyo. Sess. Laws 191 section 301 
(2005)
Continued on next page
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* Connecticut’s 15% cap is effective July 1, 2019.
† Idaho’s 10% cap is effective May 31, 2017.
‡ The statutory text available through Maine’s Legislature does not yet reflect the changes from the 2015 legislative session.
§  This figure reflects current Minnesota statute and represents a level up to which surplus state revenue should be automatically deposited 
in the Budget Reserve Account. However, the effective savings target for the account includes additional deposits and sits at a higher level 
determined by Minnesota Management & Budget (MMB) and updated periodically throughout the fiscal year. As of October 2015, the 
funded level for the Budget Reserve Account was $994 million. In its September 2015 “Budget Reserve Report,” MMB recommended a 
combined $2.03 billion savings target for the Budget Reserve Account and the separate Cash Flow Account in the fiscal 2016-17 biennium.
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